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Abstract
Central banks have accumulated unparalleled power over the conduct of macroeco-
nomic policy. Key for this development was the articulation and differentiation of
monetary policy as a distinct policy domain. While political economists emphasize the
foundational institutional changes that enabled this development, recent performativity-
studies focus on central bankers’ invention of expectation management techniques. In
line with a few other works, this article aims to bring these two aspects together. The
key argument is that, over the last few decades, central banks have identified different
strategies to assume authority over Bexpectational politics^ and reinforced dominant
institutional forces within them. I introduce a comparative scheme to distinguish two
different expectational governance regimes. My own empirical investigation focuses on
a monetarist regime that emerged from corporatist contexts, where central banks
enjoyed Bembedded autonomy^ and where commercial banks maintained conservative
reserve management routines. I further argue that innovations towards inflation
targeting took place in countries with non-existent or disintegrating corporatist struc-
tures and where central banks turned to finance to establish a different version of
expectation coordination. A widespread adoption of this Bfinancialized^ expectational
governance has been made possible by broader processes of institutional convergence
that were supported by central bankers themselves.
Keywords Expectations . Financialization .Monetarism .Monetary policy . Neoliberal
institutional change . Performativity
For a long time, the practices of central banks reflected the interstitial positions that
these organizations occupied in between banking sectors and the state. Accordingly, the
art of central banking consisted in mediating between the interests and rationalities of
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behind the scenes^ (King 2016, p. XI). But in the past 50 years, central banking has
been radically transformed. Monetary policy has emerged as a distinct and highly
visible public policy domain (Capie et al. 1994; Fisher 1994; Goodhart 2004, 2011;
Siklos 2002; Singleton 2011). By claiming exclusive responsibility for this domain, and
by giving monetary policy an increasingly prominent role in the broader conduct of
macroeconomic management, central bankers have acquired unprecedented power and
now count as the quintessential technocratic authorities of our time (Jacobs and King
2016; Tucker 2018).
A diverse set of literatures in political economy, sociology, and anthropology
addresses the conditions and processes that have led to this change. While political
economy has tended to stress paradigmatic shifts in the conduct of economic policy
(Blyth 2002; Hall 1986, 1993) and foundational institutional changes towards Bhard
money^ regimes (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Goodman 1992; Streeck
2014), more recent studies in sociology and anthropology explore innovations in the
central banks’ Bperformative^ expectation management techniques (Braun 2015; Hall
2008; Holmes 2013; Nelson and Katzenstein 2014). The lesson learnt from these
literatures is that central banks’ power reflects institutional configurations as well as
successful employments of future-oriented, Bexpectational^ governing techniques. This
insight is particularly reflected in Greta Krippner’s (2011) work, who combines an
original analysis of transformations in the US economy with a detailed account of
changing discourses and modes of intervention at the Federal Reserve. According to
her analysis, the Fed assumed a facilitative role towards financial expansion and
simultaneously used markets to depoliticize the distributional consequences that
followed from its own policy regime (see also Konings 2011; Mallaby 2017; Jacobs
and King 2016). Braun (2018b) pursues a parallel argument for the European Monetary
Union and suggests that the European Central Bank actively fosters a closer integration
and expansion of financial markets in order to strengthen its own governing capacities
(see also Gabor and Ban 2016).
Krippner, Braun, and others thus reconstruct a particular alliance between the
market-based practices of central banking and dominant institutional configurations
found in Bfinancialized capitalism^ (Carruthers 2015). In this article, I aim to generalize
this finding and relate it to a broader comparative frame. For that purpose, I draw on
Beckert’s (2016) idea that capitalist democracies are centrally about cooperation and
conflict around the definition of hegemonic expectations. Since central banks confront
the challenge of orienting expectations towards monetary stability goals, they thus need
to assume a strategic, coordinative position within these Bexpectational politics.^ I
suggest that, with a comparative lens, we can identify different resources that central
banks draw on in order to assume authority over expectations, and that they rely on
strategic relations to constituencies with leverage over expectational dynamics in the
respective monetary spheres.
Through this lens, we can analyze and compare how two regimes of performative
central banking emerged during the past 50 years. The first one originates from
experiments with monetarism during the 1970s (Laubach and Posen 1997). There
exists much controversy and confusion about this particular historical phase (van
Gunten 2015). Some authors closely associate the rise of monetarism with a paradigm
shift towards neoliberalism (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Hall 1986, 1993),
while others stress that money supply control never consolidated as a proper monetary
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policy technique (e.g., Braun 2015). By showing how central banks and other actors
drew on monetarism in order to engage with the broader politics of expectations, I aim
to clarify under what conditions Bmonetarist performativity^ succeeded or failed.
Central banks that successfully performed monetarism occupied positions of Bembed-
ded autonomy^ (Evans 1995) vis-à-vis the corporatist institutions of Bcoordinated
market economies^ (Hall and Soskice 2001) and orchestrated expectations through a
popular rhetoric of monetary stability, discipline, and restraint. The banking sector
played a major facilitative role in this concertation by maintaining stable routines of
reserve management with central banks (Johnson 1998). But these highly specific
Bfelicity conditions^ (Austin 1962) were not met in most capitalist democratic states.
Intense labor conflicts (Goldthorpe 1978; Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002),
adversarial politics (Prasad 2006), and fragmented and open financial sectors
undermined early attempts in the majority of countries at concerting expectations with
monetarist techniques. Authorities in these countries failed to define money authorita-
tively; they did not accumulate credibility through their targeting frameworks; and they
failed to enlist powerful constituencies into expectational coordination processes.
This re-interpretation and contextualization of monetarism will help setting the scene
for inflation targeting as the most powerful and most widely adopted expectational
governance regime. As mentioned above, Krippner, Braun, and others point to its close
association with financialization as a structural process and institutional transformation
in capitalist democratic states. Through my comparative lens, I can add two findings to
this literature: First, it was the very inability of strategically important central banks to
bring about the conditions required for the Bfelicitous^ use of monetarism that explains
their subsequent turn to inflation targeting as a fundamentally different version of
expectational governance that is reliant on a radically different set of supportive
conditions. Rather than using corporatism, inflation targeters rely on weak labor unions
(Hung and Thompson 2016) and they actively foster market-based versions of banking
in order to generate a version of future-oriented coordination that is oriented towards
finance. Secondly, my comparative lens provides a new perspective on the central
banks’ recent convergence towards inflation targeting techniques. In contrast to mon-
etarism, inflation targeting could travel beyond its Bincubator contexts^ in the United
States, Britain, and New Zealand (Hetzel 2008; Holmes 2013) because its enabling
conditions—interconnected, liquid markets, formal operative central bank indepen-
dence combined with technocratic prestige, and weak labor unions—spread in con-
junction with the respective intervention techniques. Key for the wide adoption of
inflation targeting thus was a process of institutional convergence (Baccaro and Howell
2017) partly supported by central banks themselves.
In the following, I elaborate on this comparative perspective by discussing two cases
that have played fundamentally different and, in some sense, complementary roles in
the broader genealogy of expectational governance regimes. The Swiss National Bank
managed to reduce inflation already during the mid-1970s and thereby became a poster
child of Bapplied monetarism^ (Brunner 1983). In this article, I show that this early
success emerged from the central bankers’ experimental discovery of strategic and
political advantages derived from communicating their decisions through monetarist
language. The SNB’s embedded authority vis-à-vis corporatist structures allowed the
central bank to turn monetarist language into a device for coordinating expectations
among diverse constituencies within the Swiss Bmonetary space^ (Dodd 1994). My
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contrasting case is Britain—a country that experienced entrenched monetary crises and
conflicts throughout the 1970s and where monetarism could not generate any stabiliz-
ing performative effects. Particular macro-conditions contributed to a highly adversarial
politics of expectations in Britain, and the Bank of England acted from a position of
embedded influence with the Treasury and City of London that failed to give it
sufficient leverage over these broader expectational dynamics. My research largely
focuses on these divergent paths, but also suggests how the respective central banks
arrived at inflation targeting during the 1990s through fundamentally different avenues:
Confronted with accelerated financial growth and globalization, the Bank of England,
following the Federal Reserve, became one of the incubator contexts for developing a
new regime of expectation management predicated on coordination with interconnected
and liquid markets; and the Swiss National Bank, like the German Bundesbank,
became a late adopter of this regime, facilitated by a change of liability management
techniques among Buniversalist^ banks (Hardie et al. 2013) and a consolidation of
employer dominance within corporatist institutions (Baccaro and Howell 2017).
In the following section, I provide a more extensive discussion of the literatures in
political economy, sociology, and anthropology in order to position my article within
ongoing debates about the construction of monetary policy and the performative power
of central banks. Here, I also introduce the concept of expectational politics (Beckert
2016) as a way to extend a promising line of research that integrates institutional-
contextual with performativity-focused arguments. I then introduce my cases and
methodologies and turn to a detailed reconstruction of experiments with monetarism
in Switzerland and the United Kingdom. In the discussion section, I relate my empirical
findings to the comparative genealogical perspective on inflation targeting proposed
above.
Explaining central bank power: political economy, performativity,
and the shape of Bexpectational politics^ in different institutional
spheres
As suggested in my opening passages, explaining the construction of a distinct public
policy domain of monetary policy and a related growth in central bank power requires
paying attention to far-reaching reconfigurations in political economies and connecting
these reconfigurations to a process of innovation in central banking that has led to the
introduction of future-oriented expectational governance techniques. Central banks’
power is performative; but performativity itself depends on Bfelicity conditions^ that go
beyond the rationalized, purposefully controlled variables of monetary policy or
isolated aspects of institutional design. The existing literature has long failed to bring
these aspects together and develop a more integrated approach. I thus briefly discuss
some of the pitfalls in dominant lines of research and argue that Beckert’s notion of
expectational politics can inform a broader comparative perspective that extends a
promising stream of literature about a symbiosis between inflation targeting and
Bfinancialized capitalism.^
One difficulty in understanding the emergence of central bank power arises from
strategies in mainstream political economy (PE) of relating institutional structures,
programmes of political intervention, and macroeconomic outcomes. To be sure, the
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PE literature has provided deep insights on inflation and money politics as symptoms of
political-economic crises and conflicts in capitalist democratic states (Burns et al. 1984;
Goldthorpe 1978; Offe 1973; Streeck 2014). We can also draw on a wealth of
qualitative-comparative and quantitative studies that relate different institutional vari-
ables (polity structures, labor relations, etc.) and shifting weights of Bmacro-groups^ to
policy priorities and outcomes (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Hung and
Thompson 2016; Ingham 2004, p. 156). But underlying causalities have oftentimes
been depicted in mechanical ways. This has tended to blind political economists to the
constitutive role that organizational innovations have played in generating new
governing techniques (for a related critique, see Herrigel 2010). A related problem is
that political economists have been unable to adequately conceptualize expectations—
Bpresent futures^ (Esposito 2011)—as ontologically distinct problems and resources for
monetary governance. The latter problem is particularly reflected in discussions of
monetarism, which is often presented as straightforward control of the money supply,
complemented in some studies with a theorization of central bank communication as a
strategic BStackelberg game^ (Barro and Gordon 1983; Iversen 1998)—i.e., a signaling
and decision-making sequence between a utility-maximizing authority and economic
agents with rational expectations. But central bank power is derived neither from
mechanical causalities nor from rational strategic games. To be sure, central banks
can generate diffuse and retarded economic effects through a forceful manipulation of
policy levers (i.e., interest rates), as Fed Chairman Paul Volcker did in 1979 (Krippner
2011). But reliable, predictable governability only arises through central banks’ pur-
chase over processes of expectation formation in the economy (Gabor 2008; Laubach
and Posen 1997). These processes cannot be captured with rational expectations models
because they are ultimately anchored in actors’ belief that central banks can maintain
monetary stability (Beckert 2016, p. 110; Hancké 2013, p. 18; Nelson and Katzenstein
2014; van Hees and Garretsen 1995; Orléan 2008).
But political economists are not alone in maintaining reductionist accounts.
Performativity-scholars following Callon’s (1998) lead have often committed the same
mistake (Konings 2018). When reducing performativity to the enactment of expertise,
they support a kind of technocratic euphoria that was first brought to life by promoters
of inflation targeting regimes (Bernanke and Gertler 1999; Blinder 2004; Mishkin
2007; Woodford 2003). To be sure, most studies with a focus on organizational
dimensions of central banking avoid euphoric technocratic claims. They rather offer
nuanced and critical perspectives on deliberative framing processes in monetary policy
committees (Abolafia 2012; Fligstein et al. 2017; Golub et al. 2015); on communica-
tion strategies (Tognato 2012; Velthuis 2015); or on the modeling and forecasting work
done in central banks (Hirschman and Berman 2014; Braun 2015). Yet, the mentioned
studies fail to challenge explicitly the prevalent technocratic framing of these practices
in mainstream economics because they provide no independent analysis of the broader
institutional ecologies in which central banking is performed. As a result, we know
very little about the Bfelicity conditions^ that allow certain versions of expectation
management to generate stabilizing effects. These problems particularly surface in
Douglas Holmes’s (2013) Economy of Words, where he largely depicts the
governability of Bpresent futures^ as technocrats’ success.
There exist a few works, though, that successfully avoid these reductionisms and
that showcase how we can relate transformations in broader institutional configurations
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to key innovations in future-oriented, performative policy techniques. In particular,
Krippner (2011) succinctly demonstrates how, in the course of the 1980s until 2000s, a
symbiotic relationship emerged between accelerated financialization and growing
central bank power in the United States (see also Konings 2011). Structural changes
in the economy supported a shift of accumulation processes from labor and consump-
tion to financial markets (Krippner 2005; Stockhammer 2008). The Fed was able to
profit from and reinforce this transformation by turning its ever-closer coordination
with markets around low inflation expectations into a new Bparadigm of governability^
(Braun 2018a) for the economy as a whole. The neoliberal regime emerging from these
developments relied, on the one hand, on expansions in housing and consumer credit
(Prasad 2012; Quinn 2017); and on the other hand, the Fed temporarily managed to
stabilize this financialized configuration by depoliticizing the resultant imbalances as
Bnatural^ market outcomes (Krippner 2011).
My article extends this latter line of research in two respects. First, I seek to
provide a more general conceptual foundation for theorizing the described
alignments between particular institutional configurations and particular perfor-
mative techniques. For that purpose, I draw on Beckert’s concept of expecta-
tional politics. Beckert (2016) introduces this term when elaborating on the
central role of expectations in enabling and coordinating capitalist action. If
expectations are built socially under conditions of uncertainty, he argues, it is
plausible to assume that power in capitalism critically resides with those actors,
who define hegemonic or Bdoxic^ expectations (Bourdieu 1977). Developing this
argument further, we can think of the emergence of contemporary monetary
governance as a process, whereby central banks rose to a position from where
they could orchestrate normative as well as cognitive expectations about mone-
tary order in a way that bolstered their Blogistical power^ (Joyce and Mukerji
2017) in the economy at large. In order to assume this strategic role, central
banks depend on two sets of conditions: First, they need to acquire sources of
authority vis-à-vis expectational politics. Their status (e.g., their ability to inter-
vene and to communicate independently), their relations with different constitu-
encies (Maman and Rosenhek 2009), their prestige as technocratic organizations
(Abolafia 2012; Braun 2015; Mudge and Vauchez 2016; Rosenhek 2013), and
the specific techniques being used in monetary policy, all influence whether
central banks can intervene in expectational dynamics authoritatively or not.
Secondly, depending on industrial relations, the structure of expert discourses
(Van Gunten 2015), and the institutional orders of finance, expectational politics
come in different shapes. For instance, expectation management fails to offer a
viable strategy of intervention in times of overt distributional conflict. Central
banks thus can only construct performative power by connecting to a consoli-
dated configuration of institutional order with dominant political-economic
forces, as found in corporatist industrial or financialized capitalism.
Based on this contextual perspective on central bank power, my second contribution
is to suggest a comparative scheme for analyzing different central banking regimes that
have emerged from different political-economic realms. The mainstream literature on
monetary policy has failed to address this question because it almost exclusively
focuses on one institutional variable to explain differences between states—whether
or not, and how much, Baccountable independence^ (Lastra 1996) is enjoyed by the
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respective central bank (Cukierman 1994). My own comparison takes up critiques of
this view, which do not deny that the particular status of a central bank matters (Bodea
and Hicks 2015), but that broaden the view to a wider set of institutional conditions that
influence the particular shape of monetary policy regimes. Works associated with the
Bvarieties of capitalism^ (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice 2001) have been particu-
larly instructive in this regard. Authors following this approach propose that we can
observe different expectational coordination processes between economic agents and
central banks depending on whether these processes take place in Bliberal^ or Bcoordi-
nated market economies^ (Hall and Franzese 1998; Hancké 2013; Iversen 1998;
Scharpf 1987). Their focus is particularly on wage bargaining, with the suggestion that
more liberal, fragmented labor markets are less conducive to coordination and thus
require central banks to intervene with costly disinflation. This contrasts with the
situation in economies with centralized wage bargaining, which provides critical
institutional support for performing disinflationary policies with communicative means.
I here take up this distinction and extend it in two respects. First, the VoC literature has
insufficiently accounted for the role and changing shape of finance. Banking sector
structures are relevant as the immediate ecologies in which central banks attempt to
implement and transmit their policies (Braun 2018b; Johnson 1998: 9; Krippner 2011).
Finance also matters because the more public and private resources are channeled
through financial markets, the more these markets develop into the primary Binsider
audience^ (Braun 2015, p. 369) for monetary policy makers. Second, as argued above,
key for central bank power is actors’ belief in central banks’ ability to govern monetary
relations. We therefore need to overcome the game-theoretic underpinnings of many
VoC models and include ritualistic procedures and narratives as constitutive features of
monetary policy regimes. Accordingly, one key distinction to be drawn between
different regimes is what types of procedures and narratives can gain credibility
(Beckert 2016) with key constituencies, including observers that are conceptualized
as Brationalized others^ (e.g., journalists, think tanks, and financial analysts) in neo-
institutionalist theory (Meyer et al. 1997).
The comparative outlook of my study should not lead to a one-sided emphasis on
difference, though. Rather, the very problem posed by the genealogy of central bank
power is how a world with different regimes of central banking adapted to highly
specific institutional settings has gradually given way to a world in which central
banks increasingly look alike and use highly codified techniques that apparently
generate reliable performative effects in a variety of countries. The existing literature
proposes two broad strategies of looking at this development. One resonates with the
political economy school discussed above and emphasizes processes of institutional
convergence (e.g., in industrial relations) during the past decades (Baccaro and
Howell 2017; Polillo and Guillén 2005). The other focuses on the growing similar-
ities in central banking techniques and explains this development in terms of
transnational epistemic communities (Marcussen 2005, 2009) and the dominance
of a particular conception of economic science (Fourcade 2006). In this article, I try
to relate both trends to more specific histories of experimentation within, and
translations between countries, showing that successes and failures with expectation
management in particular settings were critical for the gradual emergence of a
widely adopted monetary policy regime (McMichael 2000). As discussed below,
this story begins in the 1970s.
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Case selection and methodology
Since the aim of this article is to trace how central banks began to engage
reflexively in expectational politics and how they constructed performative
power on these grounds, I need to go into considerable empirical detail and
thus must limit the number of cases I discuss. In the following comparative
analysis, I focus on just two: Switzerland and the United Kingdom. I selected
these two countries because they represent two dominant and complementary
paths towards performative central bank power (see Fig. 1). The Swiss National
Bank succeeded in taming inflation already during the 1970s and thereby
became an early Brole model^ of how to use monetary policy tools effectively
(Brunner 1983). With its strong parallels to the German case (Laubach and
Posen 1997), Switzerland allows us to reconstruct how corporatist institutional
configurations and monetarist expectation management became aligned. In many
respects, Britain stands on the opposite end of the spectrum. During the 1970s,
the Bank of England proved unable to mobilize monetarist techniques in order
to assume authority over a highly contentious expectational politics character-
ized by distributional conflicts and ideological polarizations (Bernanke and
Mishkin 1992, p. 214; Bernanke et al. 2001). But as I attempt to show in
the BDiscussion^ section below, the Bank of England’s early failure was even
more consequential for the long-term development of monetary policy than
Switzerland’s early success. For it was on the back of the central bank’s
inability to use monetarist techniques performatively in a Bliberal market^
context that inflation targeting, as a Bfinancialized^ expectation management
regime, emerged. In that sense, the British case can be likened to the US
trajectory, as succinctly characterized in Krippner’s (2011) and Konings’s
(2011) works.
The evidence being used in the following section comes from a diverse set
of sources: I collected documents from eight archives in Switzerland and Great
Britain and conducted oral history interviews with persons who were involved
in policy making or policy debates during the 1970s.1 While the interview data
suffer from possible false memories and biases frequently found in personal
retrospective accounts, I could often triangulate interviewee statements with
historical sources and thereby evaluate the truthfulness of accounts. A list of
interviewees, including biographical information, is provided in the Appendix
Table 2.
I have bundled this voluminous and heterogeneous empirical material to
reconstruct trajectories of experimentation during the 1970s and their divergent
outcomes. In the next section, I provide detailed narratives of these trajectories.
In the Discussion-section, I then use this analysis to contextualize early exper-
iments within longer, convergent trajectories towards inflation targeting regimes.
1 The respective archives in Switzerland are: Swiss National Bank Archive (SNBA); Swiss Federal Archives
(SFA); Swiss Economic Archive; online archive of the Neue Zuercher Zeitung (NZZ); Archive of the Swiss
Bankers’ Association (SBAArchive). In Britain, I visited the Bank of England Archive (BoE Archive) and the
National Archives (NA). I also used the archive of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS Archive).
Abbreviations of the archives’ names are used for referencing purposes.
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Divergent paths of monetarist experimentation in Switzerland
and the United Kingdom
Switzerland: from Bsleepy^ central banking to the orchestration of monetarist beliefs.
The collapse of Bretton Woods marked a key event for the subsequent
development of monetarist expectation management in Switzerland. The central
bank itself had abandoned a fixed exchange rate of the Swiss franc to the US
dollar in January 1973 when it was confronted with a massive wave of capital
inflows from Italy and the United States (Halbeisen and Straumann 2012;
Straumann 2010). But at the moment of their decision, the central bankers did
not see the transition to flexible exchange rates as a turning point. Rather, the
SNB took this consequential decision for short-term reasons – because extensive
US dollar purchases were perceived as a threat to domestic monetary stability
and because the central bank feared losses on the growing amounts of dollar
assets on its balance sheet.2
Rather than being perceived as an opportunity, a regime of flexible exchange
rates thus first triggered a larger political and institutional crisis in Switzerland.
For most of the 1970s, the central bankers and the Secretary of Finance
envisaged a return to fixed exchange rates. However, Swiss plans to join a
European regime of fixed parities failed because the Swiss were initially unsure
about the terms and conditions for joining and later encountered opposition to
their membership from France (Halbeisen 2005). This meant that Switzerland
continued to struggle with an appreciating currency that posed serious difficul-
ties for the country’s sizable export industry. In that same period, inflation also
rose from a moderate 3.5% in 1970 to almost 9 % in 1973 and up to 10 % in
1974. Even prior to the SNB’s decision to Bfloat,^ the government and the
central bank had attempted to contain this inflationary trend. But when the
crisis became more pressing, there existed no adequate basis for a response. It
became increasingly clear that the informal and temporary anti-inflation
2 In the SNB’s press release from 23rd and the protocol of the SNB Directorate meeting from 25th January
1973, floating is presented as a Btemporary^ measure (SNBA).
Inflation statistics (annual percentage changes in consumer price indices) for Switzerland 
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Fig. 1 Inflation statistics (annual percentage changes in consumer price indices) for Switzerland (solid line),
Great Britain (short dashes), and OECD average (long dashes); source: OECD
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measures that had been used during much of the post-war period (Gentleman’s
Agreements with commercial banks) were no longer effective (Bernholz 2007).
Moreover, entrenched opposition to centralized state power and vested banking
interests prevented the legal reforms needed to introduce more draconic controls
over the domestic credit supply.
However, despite these clear signs of crisis, it is important to note that
pressure on the authorities from politicians, experts, and interest groups remained
weak. Political opposition to government policies and electoral competition for
alternative solutions were virtually absent in Switzerland. To be sure, parliamen-
tarians from different parties stressed their concerns for inflation as national
problem BNo. 1^3; most policy makers also promoted a proto-monetarist inter-
pretation of the crisis.4 However, the political culture of BConcordance^ and the
weakness of electoral competition in Switzerland meant that political mobiliza-
tions had hardly any impact on actual policy-making.5
A similar argument can be made about the role of economic expertise.
Monetarism quickly assumed a hegemonic status in academic debates. In
contrast to other countries, post-war Keynesian macroeconomics had never
taken hold in Switzerland. Many professors instead maintained their sympathies
for Hayekian and ordo-liberal ideas. The new scientific monetarism developed
in the United States thus found fertile ground among the Swiss academic elite.
Two economists were particularly important in this cross-Atlantic translational
work (Ban 2016; Bockman and Eyal 2002): Karl Brunner, a Swiss national
who had taken up a professorship at the new University of Rochester Business
School in 1971 (Fourcade and Khurana 2013); and Juerg Niehans, also a Swiss
with a chair at Johns Hopkins. Besides Milton Friedman, Brunner counts as the
eminent figure in advancing and promoting monetarist ideas.6 In Switzerland,
3 See, e.g., the protocols of parliamentary debates on 5th March and 18th September 1974 (SFA).
4 In a parliamentary initiative—the BMotion Franzoni^ (named after the initiator Enrico Franzoni)—in
September 1974, some twenty conservative parliamentarians asked the government and central bank to bring
monetary growth into line with the growth of real GDP and additionally urged the government to reduce the
federal deficit (See Motion Franzoni, protocol of parliamentary debates from 17th September 1974, SFA).
Nello Celio actually agreed with these proposals, arguing that Bexcessive liquidity and a circulation of too
much money are the main causes of inflation. We must, by all means, try to reduce the money supply.^
(Protocol of parliamentary debates, 5th October 1972, FSA). Also see the protocol of a meeting of the SNB
Directorate on 23rd October 1974 (SNBA).
5 The Bmagic formula^ for distributing the seats in government among the different parties remained identical
from 1959 until 2003. This also implied that ruling policy makers were not sanctioned on the grounds of their
Bwrong^ decisions and power was not redistributed to those politicians with alternative economic policy
agendas. To give just some examples, Federal Councillor of finances Nello Celio (1968–1973) remained in
power even after his foreign exchange policy had dramatically failed and was succeeded in 1974 by a member
of the same party (Liberal-Radicals), George-André Chevellaz (1974–1978). In the economics department,
Ernst Brugger (Liberal-Radicals) remained Councillor for almost the entire 1970s (1970–1978). The only
party that had consistently advocated flexible exchange rates from the late 1960s onwards, the Alliance of
Independents, actually lost votes in the election following the involuntary float.
6 Brunner is founder of two academic journals (Journal of Money, Credit and Banking and Journal of
Monetary Economics), two important conference series (Rochester-Carnegie Conference Series on Public
Policy; Konstanz Seminars on Monetary Theory and Monetary Policy), and co-founder of the Shadow Open
Market Committee (SOMC).
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he effectively served as the monopolistic translator of US-style monetarism
(e.g., Brunner 1971). But despite their considerable influence in academic
circles, neither Brunner nor Niehans succeeded in shaping policy through these
ties. Academics in the 1970s generally had weak leverage over economic policy
issues. There existed no apparatus of technocratic policy advice and Swiss
politicians and bureaucrats held low regard for economists’ abstract models
and Blofty^ ideas.7
One would also misread the Swiss case when viewing the arrival of monetarist
monetary targeting as a consequence of powerful banking interests prevailing over
those of workers and industry, as suggested in many discussions on monetarism
(e.g., Ingham 2004; Streeck 2014). First, there existed wide agreement among the
various interest groups, and particularly among middle-class savers, that inflation
posed a serious concern (Bernholz 1974, p. 119). Secondly, even if we can
theorize, following the logic of monetary economics (Mundell 1968), that Swit-
zerland faced a difficult trade-off between stabilizing the domestic price-level or
avoiding an appreciation of the Swiss currency (under conditions of free capital
flows), the implicit interest group conflict associated with this trade-off (Frieden
2002) was not clearly understood. This is best illustrated with reference to the
large commercial banks who supported a fixed parity regime that, under condi-
tions of free capital mobility, would have considerably constrained the conduct of
monetary policy.8 More broadly, then, strong ties and cooperative consultations
among bankers, corporate leaders, and trade unionists led to similar, even if
inconsistent and poorly rationalized, demands and views.
Weak pressure from politicians, experts, and interest groups thus gave the
central bank considerable room to maneuver in this situation of crisis. But the
central bankers first felt overburdened by a situation characterized by radical
uncertainty. The idea of shaping monetary expectations through their policy
tools was not intuitive for bureaucrats, who had spent most of their professional
lives safeguarding a fixed parity regime. At the time, the incoming SNB
7 In a classic defense of Btraditional^ central banking, the SNB Director Leutwiler claimed at the very same
conference where Brunner promoted his scientific monetarism that, when it came to the question of how to
control the money supply, Btheory gets lost in the lofty heights [….] Always, in the economic sphere, there will
exist a gap between theoretical ideas and political reality^ (Leutwiler 1971, p. 278, my translation). Another
good example of the feeble role of economics is provided by the absence of serious interventions by
economists in the debate about fixed versus flexible exchange rates. For instance, within the SNB’s own
advisory body, equipped with several professors from Swiss universities, economists expressed diverging
opinions regarding exchange rate policies. However, nobody in this group ever tried to develop a policy
solution for the central bank, based on Bhard^ evidence. Even strong advocates of flexible exchange rates,
associated with the Mont Perélin Société, failed to challenge the central bank on that matter. Moreover, while
being more cautious than Councillor Celio in their critique of economics, the two SNB Presidents Edwin
Stopper and Fritz Leutwiler also expressed disbelief in the formalization of economic expertise (see SNBA 2.1
2383). Karl Brunner aimed to change this situation but he personally was too busy with his cross-Atlantic
crusade for monetarism and free market politics to do the necessary empirical work for developing specific
monetarist policy prescriptions for Switzerland.
8 Interview Bernholz with Lademann; see also Bulletin des Schweizerischen Bankvereins Nr. 3 1966: 55 and a
UBS bulletin from 1973 (found in SNBA J.217); Loepfe (2011, pp. 244, 392).
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President expressed a sense of institutional impotence by remarking that he had
Bno idea^ how to practice monetary policy under flexible exchange rates.9
Only changes within the organization and incremental learning from policy exper-
imentation altered this state of affairs. A small but consequential step was taken in the
early 1970s with the recruitment of new personnel for the SNB’s small research unit.
While occupying a marginal position within the organization, the incoming researchers
did important groundwork for introducing scientific monetarism to the SNB. For
instance, Alex Galli embarked upon doctoral research for the development of
Switzerland’s first systematic monetary statistics.10 Brunner played a supportive role
in this project as a mentor for the young economist. The second recruit was Kurt
Schiltknecht, who joined Galli in 1974 to work on a monetary policy strategy, which
was informed by Brunner’s ideas. These two economists wrote a proposal for targeting
the monetary aggregate M1 (consisting of current accounts plus cash) and suggested
that the SNB could hit this target by controlling the central bank’s provision of reserves
(cf. Brunner 1968). The respective forecasts used for this strategy were based on crude
regression analyses with limited amounts of data; the economists also made a huge leap
of faith when stipulating that the central bank could unilaterally control the volume of
commercial bank reserves (Goodhart 1983, p. 48).11
But despite its shaky foundations, the economists successfully pitched this strategy
to the SNB’s governing body, the Directorate, which adopted their proposal in Decem-
ber 1974.12 There is a strong indication, though, that this adoption was based on a
considerable dose of ignorance among the Directorate and did not imply a pro-active
choice for Brunner-style Bmonetary base targeting^ as the SNB’s new strategy. In the
press release announcing the first monetary target, the Directors only mentioned the
monetary target figure in combination with other measures (e.g., voluntary credit
restrictions) and as a political objective to be pursued together with the federal
9 Interview Bernholz with Schiltknecht. Halbeisen confirms that B[w]hen the Swiss National Bank
discontinued its dollar purchases for exchange rate support purposes on 23 January 1973, no theoretically-
backed monetary policy procedure existed that could be applied in a flexible exchange rate environment^
(2005, p. 103) Indeed, the whole central bank organization at the time seemed unfit for implementing
something like a monetary strategy. The 400 or so employees were trained and employed in order to
administer the SNB’s reserve holdings, implement transactions with banks, control the issuance of currency
and, above all, produce proper documentation of all these operations; but they were not trained in addressing
conceptual problems of monetary policy. Alexander Galli, who joined the central bank’s Economics and
Statistics Department (BVOSTA^) in 1973, gives a nice description of the corresponding organizational
culture: BAt the beginning of the 1970s, the SNB was just one state institution among many. I still remember
my first days there: This was a dusty organization with many old ladies, who would sit at their rumbling
calculators and produce files. They were all very industrious. And at 12 o’clock, everybody went for lunch.
Silence. And at half past one, everybody returned and work continued until five. After that, it turned dark^
(Interview with author).
10 Some attempts in that direction had been made during the late 1960s and early 1970s (by Professor René
Erbe in 1969 and the Basle Centre for Economic and Financial Research in 1970); but these attempts had
remained unsystematic. As a result, in the early 1970s, the SNB still published monetary statistics with unclear
meaning and a dubious calculative basis. Galli was the first to address this shortcoming (see particularly
Alexander Galli, BDie Definition der Geldmenge,^ 16th June1972 SNBA 2.1/2406).
11 In their first Proposals for Money Supply Policy in 1975 from 21th October 1974, Schiltknecht and Galli
wrote: BIn order to better capture the importance of the monetary base for the central bank’s money supply
policy, we assume that the National Bank can determine the monetary base^ (SNBA 2.13.11, pp. 4–5; my
translation and emphasis).
12 SNB press release on 8th January 1975 (SNBA).
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government, not as a stand-alone monetary policy adopted by the central bank. Initially,
the Directors were also much more concerned about their inability to avoid Swiss franc
appreciation and thought that this situation would disallow the conduct of independent
monetary policy.13 Lastly, and most importantly, the Directors continued to decide on
the central bank’s policy interventions primarily with an eye on the Swiss franc’s
external value, not in an attempt to hit their monetary target.14
This situation changed only gradually, due to situational opportunism and incre-
mental learning inside the central bank. This process was crucially supported by
broader economic developments. After the abandonment of a fixed parity in January
1973, the Directors had already considerably downscaled their US dollar purchases and
thereby also reduced the rate of expansion of the central bank’s balance sheet—what
monetarists call the Bmonetary base^ (Rich 1987, p. 5). Partly as an unintended
consequence of this move, a recession had begun in 1974, which had contributed to
a sudden fall in money-demand and inflation. This implied that a critical precondition
for the disruption of an ongoing inflationary process—a drastic change in economic
conditions—had been accomplished incidentally, before a strategy of monetary
targeting had been adopted. When the results of this incidental disinflation became
evident in the mid-1970s through reduced inflation rates, the central bank Directors
finally found virtue in the researchers’ monetarism because it allowed for a post-hoc
rationalization of their earlier interventions. In particular, the monetarist framework
suggested that disinflation was achieved by an intentional policy move, not by the
Directors’ unsuccessful attempts at managing the rate of foreign exchange.15
This experience motivated the Directors to translate the advice from their internal
experts into a future-oriented policy language that was conducive to internal sense-
making and to public communication (Abolafia 2010). Internally, the targets articulated
assumptions about changes in the banks’ reserves that were ultimately anchored in
relatively stable routines of banking and liquidity management. This meant that, even
though targets were frequently based on wrong forecasts or missed, they maintained a
certain degree of plausibility within stable routines. On the back of this stability, the
SNB then promoted monetary targets in its public communication. In particular, the
central bankers soon realized that narrating central bank decisions through monetarism
helped depicting the ongoing disinflation as successful constraint of the money supply
and to divert attention away from exchange rate developments that troubled the export
industry. By the second year of targeting, the SNB officials explicitly stressed these
Bpsychological-political^ effects that their targets brought about and consciously used
13 In a speech in April 1975, Fritz Leutwiler argued that flexible exchange rates brought more problems than
previously assumed and that monetary policy, even under these conditions, was not independent of foreign
influences. He explicitly expressed his support for a return to fixed parities (Die Notenbank zwischen Inflation
und Konjunkturrückgang, Neue Zurcher Zeitung 24th April 1975).
14 Six weeks after the first announcements of monetary targets, the economist Kurt Schiltknecht contacted
President Fritz Leutwiler to claim that the SNB’s actions did not correspond to its strategy. In particular,
Schiltknecht complained that the Directorate continued to intervene in the foreign exchange markets in an
attempt to avoid further Swiss franc appreciation and thereby expanded the monetary base beyond the target
(Interview Bernholz with Schiltknecht).
15 In the propsoals for money supply control in 1976, the economists proposed a new procedure of decision
making. According to this procedure, economists would set monetary targets annually and specify quarterly
sub-targets. They would then provide quarterly assessments of whether or not actual money supply
corresponded to these targets (SNBA 2 13.11), correcting, if necessary, the targets for the subsequent quarters.
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monetarist language to manipulate public expectations about their policy course.16 To
maximize these symbolic effects, they introduced press conferences, official publica-
tions, background conversations with journalists, and regular gatherings with different
peak associations.17 A press department was established to give these actions profes-
sional support.
These communicative efforts proved highly successful. Quickly, officials and poli-
ticians in Berne absorbed the monetarist message and even oriented fiscal policy
towards monetarist aims (Baltensperger 1984; Guex 2012; Prader 1981, p. 566).18
Equally, the representatives of peak associations, who were members of the SNB’s own
supervisory body, adopted monetarist beliefs and taught their own members—e.g.,
trade unionists—to articulate their own interests in monetarist terms. The influential
daily Neue Zuercher Zeitung, which had long-established ties with the central bank,
helped promoting the SNB’s narrative about how Bmonetary targeting^ supposedly
worked.19
This broad endorsement of monetarist beliefs in the Swiss polity empowered the
central bank, which could performmonetary policy by concerting expectations based on
these beliefs—a concertation that worked all the better because expectation-
coordination was facilitated by strong corporatist structures (Katzenstein 1985) and still
rather cohesive and powerful networks between elites (Bühlmann et al. 2012; Kriesi
1980). When, in the late 1970s, it became increasingly evident that the SNB frequently
missed its own targets, the central bankers themselves realized that their own power and
authority had become partly decoupled from the central bank’s ability to steer the banks’
volumes of reserves. Leutwiler expressed this understanding in the following words:
The development of monetary aggregates shows that the central bank is far away
from achieving its ideals. Indeed, the volatility of monetary aggregates in Swit-
zerland is greater than, for instance, in the United States. At the same time, the
US monetary authorities face much harsher criticism than the Swiss. If you look
for an explanation of that paradox, it is important to recognize that the results of
monetary targeting are more favorable in Switzerland than the volatility in
aggregates would suggest […] We here have to acknowledge the importance of
psychology: It is of secondary importance whether the monetary target is three,
four or five per cent.What matters more is that the message sent together with the
aggregates is properly understood: This message consists of the declared will to
be serious in fighting inflation; the primary issue thus is credibility, which—as
shown in the US case—is easily destroyed but difficult to re-build.20
16 SNBA protocols of the Directorate, 25th November 1976.
17 The SNB started to hold annual press conferences on its monetary policy course in January 1975.
18 For instance, in a public defense of the proposed central banking law, the Finance Department stated:
BBecause money influences the economy, monetary policy focuses on controlling the money supply. Its
optimal volume depends on economic growth […] It is beyond doubt that control of the money supply
provides a necessary condition for a stable level of prices over the long term and is inevitable for the smooth
functioning of money and capital markets^ (Message of the Federal Department of Finance in support of a
change of the Federal central banking law, pp. 773–775, SFA).
19 See, for instance, NZZ articles from 27th November 1976; 2nd February 1978; 16th/17th September 1978;
12th/13th May 1979; 21st August 1979; 15th/16th December 1979.
20 Protocol of the SNB Bank Council meeting 12th June 1981 (SNBA).
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It is no wonder, then, that the Swiss National Bank sustained its commitment to
monetarism long after Brunner’s and Friedman’s doctrines had fallen out of favor with
academics (Snowdon and Vane 2005, p. 196). Monetary targeting had turned into a
source of symbolic power for the central bank that facilitated expectational coordina-
tion within a political-economic context held together by consensual politics, strong
corporatism, and interconnected elites.
Great Britain: from coordinated macroeconomic policy to expectational crisis.
Britain is the paradigmatic case of Bmonetary policy failure^ and ideological
polarization around money politics in the 1970s. In the political economy litera-
ture, this case thus has often been cited to exemplify how Keynesian demand
management ran into a Bstagflation^ crisis (Hall 1986); how political-economic
conflicts fueled inflation (Goldthorpe 1978; Streeck 2014); and how neoliberals
capitalized on this situation with their militant use of monetarist ideas (Fourcade-
Gourinchas and Babb 2002; Hay 2001). In this case analysis, I aim to show how
these different developments culminated in a crisis of expectations in the late
1970s and why the Bank of England, despite the production of sophisticated
expertise and clever maneuvering, failed to intervene in the politics of expecta-
tions in effective ways.
A key difference to Switzerland was that in Britain, a powerful Bmacro-
economic policy executive^ (Fforde 1983, p. 52) had developed in the post-war
era, with HM Treasury at its heart (Peden 2000, p. 438). The decision-making
processes within this executive were not much challenged by the collapse of the
fixed exchange rate system named after Bretton Woods. Rather, the Treasury,
under the watchful eyes of the Prime Minister, continued to decide on fiscal
policy, monetary policy, the broader strategies of debt management, and exchange
rate interventions (Burnham 2007). Meanwhile, the Bank of England maintained
control over banking politics (Moran 1984, 1991) and over the money market and
debt management instruments used for influencing short- and long-term interest
rates (Needham 2014, pp. 14–18).
In the early 1970s, signs of crisis popped up on several fronts. First, in 1967, Great
Britain had experienced a current account imbalance crisis. The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) had been willing to provide support, but in return requested measures to
reduce excess demand resulting in a notorious external deficit. British officials suc-
cessfully lobbied against the Fund’s attempt to apply the IMF’s own monetarist model
(discussed in Polak 1997) to the UK economy and prevented the imposition of hard
Bconditionalities.^ The compromise found was that Britain would voluntarily constrain
Bdomestic credit expansion^ with the use its own macroeconomic policy tools
(Goodhart and Needham 2018).
The second problem confronted by the authorities came from the expansion of
financial market activities outside the regulated sector, including Boffshore^ Eurodollar
trading and growth in the so-called Bfringe^ sector (Moran 1984). The authorities
themselves had readily accepted these developments in an attempt to restore the
international prestige of London as an Bentrepôt^ for offshore capital (Burn 1999;
Green 2016). By the late 1960s, however, Bank of England officials realized that the
expansion of offshore finance threatened domestic banking (Ross 2004) and thereby
undermined the effectiveness and legitimacy of the Bank’s relations to the City (Capie
2010: 488; Turner 2014). Key officials in the Bank thus believed that the central bank
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needed to alter fundamentally its banking politics, reducing the regulatory burden on
recognized institutions and re-stablishing a Blevel playing field.^21
First experiments with monetarism in 1971 resulted from an attempt to resolve these
two problems simultaneously by devising new methods of monetary restraint, not from
any belief in Chicago-school ideas.22 Crucially, the proposal was to put restraint of the
money supply at the heart of the government’s broader macroeconomic policy procedures,
creating Bconsistency and coherence of fiscal and monetary decision-making within the
wider governmental apparatus^ (Fforde 1983, p. 52). This gave rise to a distinctly British
version of monetarism called the Bcounterparts approach^ (Goodhart and Needham 2018;
Hotson 2010). The idea behind this approachwas for themacroeconomic policy executive
to coordinate the use of its various tools—fiscal policy, debt management, monetary
policy, banking regulation—in order to control the different components that made up the
broadmonetary aggregateM3 (consisting of cash, current and saving accounts) (Goodhart
1986, p. 81). There prevailed a hope in the Bank and some parts of the Treasury that the
executive could thus achieve monetary control by constraining bank credit to the govern-
ment (i.e., by reducing the fiscal deficit or by selling more government bonds) and to the
private sector. These measures should help complying with IMF demands in a way that
moved banking politics away from direct credit controls.
While negotiations about these changes took place on an executive level, a new research
unit within the central bank provided intellectual support.23 Within the newly established
Economic Section (later called Monetary Policy Group), Charles Goodhart and colleagues
justified the Bank’s cautious turn to monetarism by suggesting that monetary policy
changes could indeed have an effect on M3 and that changes in M3 would trigger
adjustments of prices and GDP (Needham 2014, p. 26; Needham and Hotson 2018).24
21
BThe lending ceiling created friction and led to a public exchange of letters between the Chairman of the
Committee of London Clearing Bankers, David Robarts, and the Governor […] Relations deteriorated further in
1969, when the Bank ‘fined’ the clearers by halving the interest paid on special deposits […] Fforde noted in
March 1969, ‘cooperation and persuasion have been pressed to their limits already’^ (Needham 2014, pp. 30–31).
22 The draft BThe Money Supply and Expenditure^, by A.D. Crockett 29th May 1968 and 15th October 1968;
and a note by Dicks-Mireaux on the same issue, 12th September 1968 express strong scepticism towards the
BAmerican literature^ (both from BoE Archive 2A128/1). For journalistic accounts of monetarism in Britain
during that period, see e.g., The Money Supply: the Great Debate, Financial Times, 25th October 1968.
23
BOrganisationally, the Economic Section was set up alongside the pre-existing EID structure […] Staff of
the Section –whether permanent or contract staff – tend to be recruited and used as (nevertheless generally
able) specialists, e.g., in economics, econometrics or mathematical techniques […] The direction of EID’s
development has already been set with the establishment of the Economic Section with the explicit purpose of
providing an economic perspective to policy discussion. This step was not taken to replace the peculiar
strength of the Bank’s contribution to UK policy-making which derives from our special relationship with
financial markets and institutions. It was rather in recognition of the fact that, despite our ‘market’ expertise,
we should be increasingly exposed to a loss of standing and influence unless we also match the growing
economic professionalism of those with whom we deal^ (Review of EID BGeorge Report^, 29th September
1975, BoE Archive 7A152/1)
24 In their paper on the Importance of Money, Goodhart and Crockett (1970) argued that the interest-elasticity
of money demand provided no strong evidence for the view - articulated for instance in the Radcliffe Report
from 1959 of a continuum between money and financial assets; but also no strong evidence for the monetarist
assumption of a negligible substitutability between monetary and financial assets. This implied, for the Bank
economists, that the traditional British doctrine of an impotent monetary policy had to be abandoned
(Needham 2014: 26), but that, at the same time, any understanding of monetary policy presupposed the
careful study of the peculiarities of the British monetary system. Moreover, the Bank economists, while
initially identifying relatively strong correlations between money supply and money income, stressed that
correlation had to be distinguished from causation, and that money supply could not be treated as exogenous.
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Monetary targeting thus made sense to the extent that it allowed authorities
to account better for monetary stability concerns and domestic banking interests
within otherwise continuous procedures of macroeconomic policy. However,
these first attempts at informal monetary targeting failed. The Bank’s wish to
establish a level playing field triggered a largely unexpected, competitive rage
in bank lending (Pepper and Oliver 2001, p. 6), which inflated one of the
Bcounterparts^ of M3. In theory, this private lending boom could have been
contained with higher reserve requirements or hikes in interest rates. But banks
found ever better ways to circumvent the central bank’s reserve requirements
(Goodhart 1989); and key members of government blocked the Bank’s attempt
to raise rates. The Prime Minister and the Chancellor feared that higher rates
would lead to higher public borrowing costs and wanted to prevent higher
charges for mortgage holders and corporations in order to support growth
(Needham 2014, pp., 70–71). The Bank officials also failed in their lobbying
for interest rate hikes because M3 actually expanded much faster than the larger
macroeconomic scenario would have suggested, discrediting monetary targets as
useful indicators for a macroeconomic policy based on integrated methods of
econometric forecasting (Hotson 2010, p. 8; Oliver 2014).25
First attempts at integrating monetary targets into the coordinated procedures
of macroeconomic governance thus failed. This meant that, from the mid-1970s
onwards, labor unions more militantly demanded wage hikes in excess of
inflation, thereby fueling an ongoing wage-price spiral (Goldthorpe 1978); and
participants in the market for government debt occasionally entered into
Bbuyers’ strikes,^ suggesting that existing interest rates insufficiently compen-
sated for the expected real devaluation of the government’s promises to pay
(Davies 2012). When in March 1976 such a buyers’ strike reoccurred in
conjunction with a 25% devaluation of the Pound, Britain had to demand
IMF assistance yet another time.
Critical for my argument is what happened in response to this crisis of 1976.
Bank of England officials had gone through a disappointing experience with
monetarism in the first half of the 1970s. They had not been able to muster
enough influence on the Treasury and the Prime Minister to achieve interest
rate hikes or restrain fiscal spending. Additionally, though, they had been
disappointed by their exercise in forecasting monetary developments with mon-
etarist tools. As Goodhart and his colleagues had discovered through continuous
econometric research, the causal connection between M3 and money income
and, more generally, the money demand function expressing relationships
among the volume of money, its velocity, and economic output had broken
down. As Goodhart wrote in a conference paper in 1974, B[i]t has not been
25
BThis research [showing a fairly stable relationship between money holdings and current and prior incomes
and interest rates, lw] provided some supporting rationale for the major change of policy in 1971, with the
adoption of Competition and Credit Control; nevertheless such research had a fairly peripheral role; the main
objective of the policy change being to get rid of the incubus of credit ceilings, whose disadvantages were
being increasingly noxious.^ (Goodhart, Bank of England Research on the Demand of Money Function, 2nd
September 1974, 2A128/12, p. 9) See also Needham (2014: 35; 45), who sees a positive role for research in
convincing those responsible for open market operations that more flexibility would not be harmful for
expectation formation in the gilt-edged market.
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possible to discern clearly in the UK the effect on the economy of altering the
rate of expansion of the monetary aggregates.^26
Executives within the Bank of England thus settled upon a strategy that would put
monetarism to a quite different use. Instead of promoting monetary targets as indicators
with technical credibility within the procedures of macroeconomic planning, they
suggested to the Chancellor a different reason for endorsing monetarism: Publicly
announced M3 targets would send a signal of confidence to the government bond
market that had become increasingly attentive to the monthly monetary statistics
published by the Bank (Hotson 2017, pp. 137–138; Oliver 2014, p. 218); and, as a
useful side-effect, the language of Btargetry^ should allow the Chancellor to discipline
internally other government departments in defense of fiscal austerity. The central
bankers believed that, should the Chancellor accept this strategy, the targets gave them
more leverage over macroeconomic policy because they were the experts observing
market developments. Publicly announced targets would thus be outward-oriented to
shape the B‘climate of opinion, expectations and attitudes’^ (cited in Oliver 2014, p.
218) in finance; and they would internally serve to put B‘a tighter robe around the
Chancellor’s neck’^ (cited in Needham 2014, pp. 90–91).27 Indeed, Chancellor Denis
Healy—to the distaste of Keynesian Treasury officials—reluctantly accepted these
Bank of England proposals. As these officials noted in 1977 B‘since July 1976, the
[Bank of England, lw] Governor had pushed the Chancellor further and further towards
the acceptance of a target for M3 growth’^ (cited in Hotson 2010, p. 10). This
acceptance also changed the context of subsequent high-level discussions on the Bank’s
policy rate, in which considerations for monthly M3 developments, measured contin-
uously by central bank researchers, took an increasingly prominent role (Hotson 2010,
pp. 3, 9).
On the back of its negative experience in the early 1970s, the Bank of England had
thus decided to propose a Treasury-led strategy of expectation management that would
also maximize the central bank’s own influence as the government’s bond market
expert. Another option had also been briefly considered—namely to become more
outspoken publicly about the monetary policy course that was favored by the Bank.
This would have implied exposing disagreements between the central bank and
government. While such public disagreement could have potentially proved useful
(e.g., when political majorities shifted), the obvious danger was that the central bank
would lose its most important political capital— Bprivate influence^ inside the Treasury
and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As one official wrote in 1977:
26 Bank of England Research on the Demand of Money Function, 2nd September 1974, 2A128/12, p. 2;
Battempts to fit demand for money equations to the post-1971 period yield generally unsatisfactory results. The
implausible parameter estimates on the lagged dependent variable confirm the trend towards such instability
suggested by Hacche’s earlier work.^ (Paper on Special Deposits, 31st January 1977, BoE Archive 6A50, p.
3). See also Price (1972) and Williams et al. (1976).
27
BThe problems of restraining public expenditures to planned limits could still prove difficult. In these
circumstances we judge it all the more necessary to include in the package an explicit monetary target for this
year, with a commitment to a further and lower target for next year. Influential opinion abroad, including the
IMF and the predominant contributors to the GAB, regards the adoption of a normative monetary target as a
matter of great importance.^ (Unknown author to governors: Money supply target 19th September 1976, BoE
Archive 6A50/18)
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BThe Bank advises but it is the Government who decides^ […] This is a stark but
accurate description of the Bank’s constitutional position. So long as this position
exists the essential questions are, first would speaking out publicly on policy
weaken or seriously harm private influence with governments; and secondly, if
so, would it matter? Many of us think that the answer to both questions is Byes.^28
Judged on its own terms, the Bank’s decision to use Bprivate influence^ and invoke
Bmarket opinion^ proved successful. William Keegan writes that, B[d]uring the period
of the late 1970s, when monetary policy came to the fore, the Bank’s influence was
seen to increase^ (1984, p. 133). At the same time, pushing the government to use
targets for shaping bond market expectations failed in addressing the underlying
problem confronted by the British state, namely, how to pursue its coordinated eco-
nomic policies vis-à-vis an increasingly fractured field of economic beliefs, expecta-
tions, and claims. Labor unions certainly remained unresponsive to the executive’s
monetary announcements, also because the Treasury and trade unions discussed on
different terms than those suggested by a bond market-oriented monetarism. The
unions’ reactions to government policy rather exposed the latter’s failure in using
incomes policies as a complementary economic policy tool (Gilmour 1982; Scharpf
1987). The more these contradictions became explicit, the more the credibility of
monetary targets was lost. Moreover, analysts from the financial markets, particularly
government debt (gilt) brokers, had begun to comment critically on every interim result
of targeting with the help of monthly published monetary statistics (Oliver 2014, p.
214; Davies 2012). Healy’s reluctant commitment to monetary targets thus exposed
him to ongoing scrutiny in terms of a highly volatile statistical aggregate. It did not help
that the most prominent among the market commentators was a committed monetarist,
Gordon Pepper (Capie 2010, p. 676), who rejected any excuses for allowing the money
supply to slip.29 Additionally, the Bank saw itself subject to Babuse, misrepresentation,
belittlement etc.^ from an emergent group of orthodox monetarists in academia and
think tanks (Foot et al. 1979; Fourcade 2009, pp. 172–173).30 These critiques resonated
with Margret Thatcher, the new leader of the Conservative party, who drew on
monetarist vocabulary to establish a morally charged distinction between the Bhalf-
baked^ fight against inflation allegedly pursued by Labour versus a more resolute,
consequential version of anti-inflationism promised by the Conservatives themselves
(Gilmour 1982).31
Entangled in these disjunctive claims and expectations, economic policy makers
could not give their targets enough credibility to turn them into expectation coordina-
tion tools. Rather, labor conflicts deepened, ideological controversies became more
polarized, and political entrepreneurs successfully contested decades-old procedures of
28 Unknown author, Externalising the Bank – second note, 23rd May 1977, note to all governors, BoE
Archive 7A127/1, p. 1. This position had a long tradition in the Bank; in front of the Radcliffe Committee,
Cobbold had argued that B‘it would quite certainly make Bank relations with Government intolerable if
discussion and argument were conducted by the Bank and Treasury in public instead of between us.’^ (cited in
Allen 2013: 208)
29 E.g., Gordon Pepper, A Monetary Base for the UK, W. Greenwell and Co Monetary Bulletin No. 61; Brian
Griffiths, How the Bank has Mismanaged Monetary Policy, The Banker 126 (610): 1411–1419, 1977.
30 MacMahon, Another Note on Externalising the Bank, 24th June 1977, BoE Archive 7A127/1.
31 Margaret Thatcher, Speech at Conservative Local Government Conference, London, 3rd March 1979,
Margaret Thatcher Foundation Archive (https://www.margaretthatcher.org, retrieved 5th March 2016).
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macroeconomic management. This was fertile ground for a political leader like Margret
Thatcher to achieve a landslide victory in the election of 1979.
Discussion
The trajectories described above are part of a broader genealogy. Since the 1970s,
central banks across globe have gradually accumulated performative power over
monetary expectations and now frequently hold exclusive authority over monetary
policy. But the narratives above also indicate that the genealogy of central bank power
is marked by various discontinuities and twists. Rather than moving in synchronicity
towards a Bcentral bank-led capitalism,^ central banks in different institutional contexts
took divergent and winded paths. Two paradigmatic instances are reflected in the Swiss
and British case. The Swiss National Bank first assumed authority over monetary
developments during the 1970s through its successful use of monetary targeting. By
the 1980s, the SNB had established itself as one of the most powerful policy organi-
zations in the Swiss polity and in the central banking world.32 The Bank of England
failed to construct a comparable regime for Britain, where the monetary crisis contin-
ued into the 1980s. However, in the course of the 1990s, the Bank gradually emerged as
one of the pioneers in inflation targeting. This strategy helped the British central bank
to carve out a jurisdiction of monetary policy based on expectation management—a
process that preceded the decision by the British government, in 1997, to grant
operational independence to the central bank. Inflation targeting then travelled the
globe, and since 1999, even the Swiss National Bank conducts monetary policy based
on a similar regime. The Swiss path resembles, in many ways, the German trajectory
that led from the Bundesbank’s widely acclaimed monetarism to a reluctant acceptance
of inflation targeting as the primary strategy of the European Central Bank (ECB); and
the British path is strongly entangled with that of the United States, where the Fed
Chairman Paul Volcker developed an incipient version of inflation targeting during the
1980s (Hetzel 2008) and where Ben Bernanke emerged as one of its key theorists.
To explain these trajectories and their interrelatedness (McMichael 2000), I suggest
looking at the ways in which central banks have assumed strategic, coordinative
positions in what Beckert calls Bexpectational politics.^ An important aspect of this
process is central banks’ search for sources of authority and means of intervention
through which they can render expectations governable. But this search does not
happen in a technocratic vacuum. Rather, central banks need to connect to the dominant
forces in institutional configurations in order to make sure that their interventions are
legitimate and generate economy-wide performative effects. Accordingly, just as VoC
scholars have argued, differences in institutional orders matter for expectation-based
monetary policy (Hall and Franzese 1998); but so do structural shifts in the centers of
power in capitalist states, e.g., those reconstructed in industrial relations (e.g., Baccaro
and Howell 2017) or financialization research (Stockhammer 2008).
32 By the early 1980s, the Swiss National Bank had therefore emerged as the unquestioned authority over
monetary relations. When the Swiss were asked about their central bank in a public survey in 1981, Balmost all
respondents^ said that they would Breadily consider anything that the SNB did as right^. Reported during a
board meeting of the Swiss Bankers Association on 29th June 1981 (SBA Archive).
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Through this lens, we can thus identify two regimes of central bank power that have
emerged from different contexts, at different times, and have shaped the broader
genealogy in different ways. The first is associated with the period studied above.
The breakdown of Bretton Woods at the beginning of the 1970s, currency crises, and
the surge in inflation reflected the dissolution of institutional settlements upon which
Bquiet^ central banking had relied. Distributional conflicts became visible, (Maier
2004) reflected, for instance, in price-wage-spirals (Goldthorpe 1978) and skyrocketing
interest rates (Streeck 2014). Central bankers responded to this constellation by grad-
ually turning to monetary expectations as their primary objects of governing. This turn
is evidenced in Switzerland and Britain, where policy experiments were increasingly
used to manipulate expectations in explicit, reflexive ways. Yet, in the course of these
experiments, certain Bfelicity conditions^ for the performative use of monetarist tech-
niques became visible that were met in Switzerland, but not the United Kingedom. The
roles of the respective central banks, broader processes of capitalist coordination, and
the structures of banking led to divergent outcomes in this first experimental period for
performative monetary policy.
The Swiss National Bank managed incrementally to turn its experts’ monetarist
ideas into an effective strategy because it possessed ample room of maneuver and
strong ties to powerful political and economic constituencies. The SNB’s role can thus
be characterized as a version of Bembedded autonomy^ (Evans 1995, p. 12), which
combines discretion over key decisions (e.g., over monetary operations and public
communications) with the ties necessary for mobilizing support. For instance, all major
peak associations were represented in the SNB’s supervisory body, the Bank Council;
the central bank Directors thus had regular occasions to communicate with key
constituencies. This contrasts sharply with the British situation. Some commentators
have depicted the Bank of England’s role as an extended arm of the Treasury (Collins
and Baker 1999), directing their focus on its lack of operational independence
(Cukierman 1994). However, it is equally important to point to the Bank’s status
vis-à-vis the financial sector. The British central bank derived most of its Bbehind-
the-scenes^ influence from a strategic brokering position in between the government
and the City of London. But this BCity-Bank-Treasury Nexus^ (Burn 1999) also
constrained the reach of the central bank and limited its engagement in expectational
politics. The Bank of England had no direct ties to corporative actors, nor to the broader
political sphere. As documented above, during the late 1970s, the central bankers
increasingly felt these limitations when they realized their inability to advocate a
restrictive macroeconomic policy publicly and to respond to criticisms from parliament,
experts, and the media.
As discussed below, in later decades, the Bank of England turned this limitation into
key resource, using its historically strong relations to finance as a foundation for a
distinct governance regime. However, the situation in the 1970s was different because,
in an ongoing inflationary spiral, it was critical to engage with the wage-setting process.
The Swiss National Bank succeeded in doing so because it could connect to existing
routines of coordinated wage bargaining. Swiss corporatism thus provided the fertile
ground for gaining direct purchase over the articulation of inflation-expectations. By
contrast, a central bank with influence constrained to the financial realm and a
government with contradictory macroeconomic policy priorities proved unable to
address the capitalist conflicts observed in the United Kingdom (Fourcade-Gourinchas
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and Babb 2002; see Hall and Franzese 1998, p. 530 for relevant indicators). The
production of orthodox monetarist counter-expertise can be seen as an attempt by
politicians and experts to exploit these conflicts for their own strategic advantage.
The result was a broader Bexpectational crisis^ in which monetary targeting, adopted in
1976 and again tried under Thatcher, failed to generate any stabilizing effects.
My study of the Swiss and British trajectories in the 1970s also exposes the critical
role that banking sectors played in facilitating or complicating the use of monetarist
techniques. Because monetary targeting relied on stable relationships between the
banks’ reserve holdings with the central bank, their different liabilities, and overall
economic activity, this technique could only be successfully conducted in contexts of
conservative, Buniversalist^ banking (Johnson 1998: 9). Banks conducting active
liability management and operating across different financial markets undermined the
credibility of any monetary targeting regime. We find these contrasting situations in
Switzerland and Britain. In the 1970s, Swiss universalist banks still cooperated with the
SNB to maintain relatively stable amounts of reserves, and in the absence of rapid
innovation, customers customarily kept stable amounts of money holdings with their
deposit banks. By contrast, in Britain, by the 1970s, banking techniques imported from
the United States began transforming domestic banking; the clearing banks’ interest
rate cartel was given up. Moreover, a financial sector that had been compartmentalized
into distinct business areas (Bclearing banking,^ Bmerchant banking,^ Bbuilding
societies,^ stock brokers, etc.) began its transition towards the dominance of financial
conglomerates (Needham and Hotson 2018; Moran 1991). In this transitional period,
credit expansion exploded and the Bank of England lost control over the management
of liquid reserves. As Goodhart, the chief translator of monetarism inside the Bank of
England argued, B[u]nder these circumstances the appropriate dividing line, or defini-
tion, of ‘money’… is becoming fuzzier^ (1986, p. 98).
Hence, the ironic result of my above analysis is that a radical, highly consequential
innovation in economic policies, towards performative central banking, was first
accomplished in rather Bconservative,^ corporatist configurations found in countries
like Switzerland and Germany. In these settings, the respective central banks managed
to use their embedded autonomy to turn monetary targets into a symbolic source of
central bank power (Friedman 2002), and they got corporatist actors to accept the
premises underlying monetary targets by engaging them with monetarist beliefs
(Orléan 2008). The central banks’ ability to promote these beliefs and to give them a
coordinative role derived from the institutional conditions encountered in the respective
political economies, i.e. the existence of a consensus-oriented polity, corporatist rou-
tines (e.g., in wage bargaining), and conservative commercial banking practices. By
contrast, where these conditions were not found, and where the central banks directed
their efforts to the more circumscribed contexts of governmental policy and finance, as
in the United Kingdom, even sophisticated monetary analyses and clever strategizing
by the respective actors failed to generate stable regimes.
However, while the successful symbiosis of monetarism and corporatism proved
highly influential and drove home a widely observed Blesson,^ namely that central
banks can control inflation, the monetarism-corporatism regime remained highly
circumscribed in its geographical reach and historical impact. For understanding
convergent developments towards inflation targeting regimes, it is therefore critical to
turn to those contexts where the monetarist regime could not take root. These were the
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liberal market economies like Britain and the United States. The key here is to
understand that, while the British and US monetary policy failures of the 1970s were
compared with the German and the Swiss success, the respective central bankers could
not emulate the Bfelicity conditions^ to turn monetarism into a stable regime (Needham
2014). Corporatist institutions and cultures cannot be simply imported into a political
economy, as the twisted history of Europeanmonetary integration attests (Hancké 2013).
Moreover, once offshore markets and innovative financial market techniques had
precipitated, attempts at re-regulating finance towards Bconservative^ domestic banking
encountered high technical and political obstacles (Konings 2011). For these reasons,
the successes with monetarism in countries like Switzerland and Germany articulated a
double challenge for the Bank of England and comparable central banks: First, they
needed to find alternative sources of authority in order to intervene successfully in
expectational politics; and secondly, they needed to identify a different set of institu-
tional conditions that would allow them to establish macro-coordination processes.
I would suggest that it is out of this challenge that an alternative, Bfinancialized^
regime of expectation management emerged. The United States, Britain, and New
Zealand provided the relevant incubator contexts for these innovations. For it was in
these countries that monetarism had dramatically failed and where prevailing
institutional conditions directed the search for viable expectational governance
regimes in a radically new direction. Indeed, while the intensification and expan-
sion of finance had been one major reason for the initial failure of performative
monetary policy in Anglo-Saxon economies during the 1970s, the emergent insti-
tutions of Bfinancialized capitalism^ (Carruthers 2015; Krippner 2011) in these
countries ironically provided a set of different Bfelicity conditions^ upon which
an alternative regime of expectational governance could be subsequently built. In
particular, while highly integrated and liquid money and capital markets had been
loathed by monetary targeters, they eventually turned into central banks’ most
powerful sources of logistical power (Hetzel 2008; Konings 2011 p. 149;
Krippner 2011; Mehrling 2011). The great advantage with these felicity conditions
was that, other than corporatist institutions, central bankers were in a position to
shape and foster the needed market architectures themselves. Complementary
institutional changes, like the weakening of labor’s bargaining power, functioned
as important background conditions for this Bfinancialized^ version of expectation
management to assume a hegemonic macro-economic role.
It is out of this distinction between the Bfelicity conditions^ needed for monetarist-
corporatist vs. financialized-inflation targeting expectation management, that I would
propose explaining the recent global convergence towards inflation targeting regimes
(see Table 1). For, in radical distinction to the institutional conditions undergirding the
SNB’s performative monetarism, those required for inflation targeting could indeed be
Bexported^ to other domains. Such export was partly performed by the financial sector,
which established American-style money and capital market structures in Britain and
other states (Konings 2011; Gabor 2016). Central bankers played an active, facilitative
role in the globalization of these market architectures (Braun 2018b; Gabor 2016).
Together with a widespread weakening of labor’s bargaining power (Baccaro and
Howell 2017; Hung and Thompson 2016) and associated processes of globalization,
these processes of institutional convergence allowed for inflation targeting to become a
widely used and successful expectation management regime (Braun 2018a).
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Conclusion
In a recent book, the former Bank of England Deputy Governor, Paul Tucker (2018)
expresses his belief that the liberalization of labor markets in Britain was an important
precondition for inflation targeting to become a durable success. But even if the Swiss
National Bank President of the 1970s, Fritz Leutwiler, did not publicly promote the
opposite, his actions certainly reflected another view: Rather than liberalism, it was
strong corporatism that contributed to the SNB’s early success in concerting expecta-
tions with monetarist means—a view that is vindicated by political economic research
(cf. Hall and Franzese 1998). Relatedly, while today’s monetary experts emphasize
formal independence and sophisticated forecasting as the key for successful monetary
policy, from the Swiss perspective it might be similarly important to stress broad
relations to diverse constituencies, including corporatist actors. Moreover, inflation
targeters claim that liquid and interconnected money markets Bare useful to central
banks^ as vehicles for policy implementation Band as a source of information on market
expectations^ (CGFS 1999, p. 3). But successful monetary targeters in the 1970s and
1980s like the Bundesbank or Swiss National Bank rather opted for highly regulated
and constrained liquidity regimes (Gabor 2016). Lastly, Ben Bernanke, in a statement
in the Federal Reserve’s decision-making body FOMC, claimed that Bmonetary policy
is a cooperative game. The whole point is to get financial markets on our side and for
them to do some of our work for us^ (Mallaby 2017, p. 612). This is now perceived as
common wisdom (e.g., Braun 2015). But monetarist central bankers did not orient their
expectation management towards financial markets; their Btargeting^ was rather direct-
ed at labor unions, employer associations, and fiscal policy makers.
It is important to draw these contrasts as they make visible that, as much as the
politics of expectations can differ from context to context, so do the strategies and tools
through which central bankers hope to gain performative power. Accordingly, we need
to attend to the processes whereby particular techniques of central banking and
particular institutional configurations have become aligned. In this article, I have
mostly focused on the first, monetarist regime that has emerged in Bconservative^
corporatist settings such as Switzerland. Implicitly, though, this analysis was directed at
Table 1 Expectational governance regimes
Expectational governance
regime
Sources of central bank authority vis-à-vis
expectational politics
Key institutional Bsupport
structures^ exploited by central
bank
Monetary targeting BEmbedded autonomy^: central bank can
experiment with money supply targets,
communicate independently, and spread





Inflation targeting Formal operational independence and
technocratic prestige. Central banks
communicate their forecast-based inflation
expectations to financial markets and relate








inflation targeting as the far more influential, structurally important regime. By intro-
ducing a comparison with the monetarist-corporatist constellation of the 1970s, I
wanted to highlight that, even though inflation targeting is now adopted in a wide
variety of settings, we should still understand it as a highly fragile, provincial, context-
dependent regime. In particular, inflation targeters have become strongly dependent on
financialized institutional configurations (Carruthers 2015) that they have helped bring
about (Braun 2018b; Krippner 2011). Accordingly, the widespread adoption of infla-
tion targeting is predicated on a broader process of institutional convergence that has
enabled central banks to converge towards similar techniques. There is no certainty that
these particular sources of performative power will remain available for central banks.
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Table 2 List of interviewees
Swiss National Bank
John Lademann (interviewed by
Bernholz in February and
March 2005)
Member of Economic and Statistical Section at least since the 1950s, later
its Head and Deputy Director (1968–1977)
Kurt Schiltknecht (interviewed
by Bernholz in September
2004 and by author in
November 2013)
Economics degree University of Zurich; PhD in Zurich and at the
University of Pennsylvania (1973); member and later head of Economic
and Statistical Section of the SNB (1974–1984), Deputy Director
(1982–1984)
Alexander Galli (interviewed by
author in November 2013)
Economics degree University of Basle (1971); member of the Economic
and Statistical Section of the SNB (1971–1979)
Georg Rich (interviewed by
author in December 2013)
Economics degree University of Zurich; PhD Brown University (1969);
assistant and associate professor Carleton University Ottawa
(1969–1977); member and later head of Economic and Statistical
Section of the SNB (1977–1985); SNB chief economist and Deputy
Director (1985–2001)
Ernst Baltensperger
(interviewed by author in
November 2013)
Economics degree University of Zurich; PhD Johns Hopkins University
(1966–1968); assistant, associate and full professor, Ohio State
University (1968–1979); member of Economic and Statistical Section of
the SNB (1977–1978)
Werner Abegg (interviewed by
author in March 2015)
Linguistics degree University of Zurich; journalist with Reuters; became the
first SNB press officer in the late 1970s and later Head of
Communications
Peter Buomberger (interviewed
by author in April 2014)
Economics degree University of Basle; Economic and Statistical Section of
the SNB (1975–1984)
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